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The majority of Acholi recognize that most combatants in the Lord ' s Resistance Army 
(LRA) were fo rcibly abducted and have themselves been victims. This creates a moral 
empathy with the perpetrators and an acknowledgement that the formal justice system is 
not sufficiently nuanced to make the necessary distinctions between legal and moral gu ilt . 
This has generated a remarkable commitment to reconciliation and a peacefu l settlement 
of the conflict rather than calling for retribution against the perpetrators of serious abuses. 
The Acholi religious, cultural. and local government leaders have advocated for tradi-
tionally-based ritual processes for war-related justice, reconciliation, and reintegration, 
particularly mato oput, the ritual climax of an Acholi justice process bringing reconcilia-
tion in the wake of a homicide within the community 
The Kony War 
The Northern Uganda conflict that fina lly spread to the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Central Africa, and Sudan originated in the marginalized Acholi 
ethnic group of Northern Uganda. It offers an ideology that is a cult-like mish-
mash of Christianity and traditional mysticism, held together by the force of 
Kony ' s charismatic and cruel leadership (Boswell, 2011 ). For more than two 
decades, the communities in Acholi , Lango, Teso and West Nile in Northern 
Uganda were subjected to the effects of a vio lent conflict between the rebel 
movement, the LRA and Ugandan forces. The conflict revolved around access to 
state power and resources, with Northerners increasingly being excluded from 
national decision and policy making process (The Justice and Reconciliation 
Project, 2011 a). 
The LRA is a brutal rebel group headed by a messianic madman whose vic-
tims are captured boys turned into soldiers, captured girl s forced into sexual slav-
ery and vil lagers put to the machete" Apart from the killings, abductions, rapes 
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and sexual enslavement of children, the war created a humanitarian disaster in 
the region, with more than a million huddled into the squalor and degradation of 
camps (Barney, 2002). 
Estimates by human rights groups calculate that at the height ofthe violence, 
more than two million people were forcibly relocated to internally displaced per-
sons (lOP) camps, tens of thousands of civilians including men, women, and 
children had been abducted and uncounted thousands more killed by the LRA 
(Northern Uganda Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG)). 
Many villagers suffered from persistent LRA attacks. The people of Uganda 
still remember the April 20, 1995, massacre when the LRA, after an intense of-
fensive, defeated the Ugandan army and entered the trading center of Atiak. They 
rounded up hundreds of men, women, students and young children and marched 
them a short distance into the bush. After being separated according to sex and 
age, they were lectured for their alleged collaboration with the government. The 
LRA commander in charge ordered his soldiers to open fire three times on a 
group of about 300 civilian men and boys as women and young children wit-
nessed the horror and told them to applaud the LRA's work. Youth were forced 
to join the LRA to serve as the next generation of combatants and sexual slaves 
(JRP 2007b). 
On October 9, 1996, 139 girls between the ages of 12 and 15 years were 
abducted from St. Mary's College in Aboke, in Northern Uganda. Sister Rachele, 
the Italian deputy headmistress, followed the abductors. Her journey took her to 
the LRA. She secured the release of the majority of her girls, but she had to leave 
behind 30. It is also on record that the Aboke Girls, as they came to be known, 
were given to LRA commanders as sex slaves. They were beaten and forced to 
become child soldiers, raiding villages and killing wantonly on command. Those 
who tried to escape were taken to the camp's execution field to be hacked and 
beaten to death by their peers (Can West, 2007). 
On October 23 , 2002, an estimated 44 fighters of LRA entered Omot sub-
county from Par Samuela Acak near the river Agago with instructions from their 
Commander "to abduct whoever they come across until they reached Corner 
Gang pa Aculu in Opota Trading Centre" (insert citation here with page number). 
The team, consisting mostly of young soldiers, first moved northeast, abducting 
12 people in Lawai Ode, an additional eight people in Lalur Onyol and finally 
another 12 people were abducted from Latin Ling before they reached the point 
of slaughter in a brutal and dehumanizing Omot massacre. People were mur-
dered, cut into pieces and then placed in cooking pots in front of dozens of wit-
nesses (JRP 2010b). 
Two years later, the LRA committed one of the largest single massacres dur-
ing its 26-year insurgency at a quiet displaced person's camp called Barlonyo. In 
a space of less than three hours, over 300 people were brutally murdered by LRA 
rebels and an unknown number abducted . Camp residents were burned alive 
Charles Baguma 33 
inside their huts, hacked to death with machetes, stabbed with bayonets, clubbed 
with sticks and shot as they fled . The bellies of pregnant women were slit open, 
their not-yet-fonned babies thrown into the fires. Others were abducted and 
marched north into Acholi-land . Many died in captivity of violence, sickness, or 
starvation and the ultimate fate of several abductees remains unknown. It is also 
on record that on May 19, 2004, LRA raided the village of Lukodi, and carried 
out a massacre that led to the death of over sixty people (JRP, 2009a). 
According to the Northern Uganda Transitional Justice Working Group 
(TJWG) these actions amount to international war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, and do contravene both social values and the laws of Uganda (TJWG, 
2011). The United States classifies the LRA as a terrorist organization and in 
October 2011 President Barack Obama sent about 100 combat-ready U.S. forces 
to help regional governments capture or kill Joseph Kony and his top lieutenants. 
The decision to deploy was based on legislation called the Lord ' s Resistance 
Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act, passed by Congress in 
2010 (Muhumuza, 2012). 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) charged Kony and two of his top 
lieutenants with crimes against humanity and would theoretically face trial if 
captured alive. However, when the chief prosecutor at the ICC announced its 
intention to investigate the LRA in 2004, many local leaders in Northern Uganda 
were opposed to the initiative. Traditional, religious and civil society leaders 
continue to argue that the ICC places "their" children at greater risk, and threat-
ens to further damage their cultural identity and beliefs. Traditional justice, based 
on restorative principles is widely supported as a favorable altemative to the 
punitive approach of the Court. A number of advocates, therefore, argue the 
Court should cease its current investigation until local approaches are given an 
opportunity to work, or until peace is realized in the region. 
Talking Peace to the LRA 
During the period from 2006 to 2008, the government of Uganda and the LRA 
conducted a series of negotiations (the Juba Peace Talks) in the attempt to reach a 
peace agreement and to discuss terms of justice and accountability. This Juba 
process produced four agreements integral to transitional justice, including com-
prehensive solutions to the war; accountability and reconciliation; disannament, 
demobilization and re integration of anned combatants; and formalization of the 
ceasefire (JRP 2006). However, in April 2008, Kony failed to sign the Final 
Peace Agreement, an act that led to the eventual collapse of the process. 
It is interesting to note, however, that Joseph Kony instead sought clarifica-
tions on the specificities on the protocol of accountability and reconciliation as 
well as the disannament, demobilization and re-integration agreements. In par-
ticular, the LRA leader wanted to know more about the Acholi traditional justice 
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system of mato oput, and its linkage to the proposed special division of the High 
Court and other formal institutions in the agreements (JRP, 2008a). 
Related to this is the famous Lira Declaration signed by cultural and religious 
leaders in the sub-regions of West Nile (Madi), Teso, Lango and Acholi , after the 
first anniversary of the Juba Peace Talks. It made several recommendations in the 
areas of truth, reparations, reconciliation and complementarity. Most importantly 
it made a call for traditional justice mechanisms to be used for justice and recon-
ciliation. It said in part, 
That traditional approaches to justice and reconciliation in Northern and Eastern Uganda 
(malo oput of Acholi, kayo cuk of Iango, ailuc of Teso and tolu koka of Madi, among 
others) share similar principles including truth-telling, confession, mediation, and repara-
tion and resulting in reconciliation and the restoration of relations, and that such tradi-
tional mechanisms are therefore locally and culturally relevant to meet ing the justice 
needs of victims of the conflict. (JRP, 2007, p. l2) 
On the other hand, the Juba peace process arguably delivered a physical 
peace in Uganda. The LRA has not attacked within Uganda since the cessation of 
hostilities was signed in 2006. The year 2009 was marked by a significant im-
provement in the humanitarian situation in Northern Uganda as the region em-
barked on the long road to recovery from conflict. The security situation im-
proved substantially, allowing thousands of IDPs to return to their original home-
steads while many of the displacement camps were demolished as proof of the 
finality of the return process. The determination to return to former homesteads 
and rebuild lives and villages stands as a testament to the capacity of those af-
fected by the conflict to persevere amidst challenges such as lacking educational, 
health and other social services (JRP, 2009a). 
The process, however, is not complete. There is also a handful of activists, 
who met in Kampala recently that say the northern civilian population saw seri-
ous abuses and violations at the hands of both the LRA and Uganda Peoples De-
fense Force, and they should be compensated. 
Some of the serious abuses stressed include killing, torture, inhuman or de-
grading treatment, abduction, slavery, forced marriage, forced recruitment, muti-
lation, sexual violence, serious psychological harm, forced displacement and 
looting. The activists want government to compensate the population in terms of 
medical, educational, and housing assistance as well as cash, vouchers, pension 
or other benefits in monetary value. The Minister of State for Northern Uganda 
Rebecca Amuge, who officiated at the meeting, said the victims claim their per-
petrators are currently receiving greater packages for reparation than themselves 
in the name of amnesty. The chairperson of the Uganda Human Rights Commis-
sion, Med Kaggwa, said reparation programs can only succeed if they are linked 
with other transitional justice measures particularly prosecution, truth telling and 
institutional reforms (UNHCR 20 II). 
Charles Baguma 35 
There is also a few other issues to sort out. The explosive weapons planted 
during the insurgency are still far from being cleared. The Danish Demining 
Group (DDG) in Uganda and Mine Action in south Sudan have revealed that the 
two countries ' border areas are still unsafe for human settlement and other activi-
ties as they harbor unexploded ordnances. Emmy Katukore, the supervisor of 
DOG revealed that so far, they have cleared only 34,255 millimeters, recovering 
five anti-personnel mines in the process (Makumbi 20 12). 
The First Domestic War Crimes Trial 
Thomas Kwoyelo, a former LRA Commander, was arrested by the Uganda Peo-
ple 's Defence Forces (UPDF) in the DRC in 2009. The Ugandan Department of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP) decided to charge Kwoyelo with war crimes under the 
Geneva Conventions and with crimes under national law. This was the first case 
of the newly created International Crimes Division (JCD) of the Ugandan High 
Court. The lCD had been founded in reaction to questions of accountability that 
arose during the Juba peace talks between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and 
the LRA. At about this time the Ugandan Parliament passed the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) Act, which allows the lCD to prosecute Rome Statute 
crimes on the domestic level. In short, the lCD referred the Kwoyelo case to the 
Constitutional Court when Kwoyelo's defence lawyers protested that he had been 
denied under the Amnesty Act. In their view, this constituted a violation of equal 
treatment under the Ugandan Constitution. The Constitutional Court decided in 
late September 2011 that K woyelo should be eligible for amnesty and ordered the 
lCD to cease the case against him. 
Even though the case was stopped, Kwoyelo remained in detention. He then 
decided to sue the GoU for illegal detention and petitioned the Ugandan High 
Court for amnesty on November 23, 2011. The High Court indeed ruled that 
Thomas K woyelo should be given amnesty and be set free. The Department of 
Public Prosecutions and the Amnesty Commission are the two competent institu-
tions in this case and decided to meet to consult about the Kwoyelo case after the 
High Court rul ing. In early February 2012 the Department of Public Prosecutions 
again denied amnesty to Thomas Kwoyelo, citing that there can be no amnesty 
for charges of war crimes. Thomas Kwoyelo thus remains imprisoned in Luzira 
in Kampala to date (Wegner, 20 12). 
According to the Justice and Reconciliation Project, "there are several con-
clusions that can be drawn out of the way this first domestic war crimes trial in 
Uganda developed." 
First and foremost, the going back and forth concerning Thomas Kwoyelo ' s amnesty un-
derlines that Uganda is at the crossroads with transitional justice. The actions of the DPP 
hint at a re-orientation towards more accountability and less amnesty in the future. The 
DPP has made that clear by repeatedly denying amnesty to Kwoyelo, despite court or-
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ders, and by announcing that it has prepared additional cases against former LRA rebels 
that it will pursue should Kwoyelo be found guilty. JRP further argues that there is no 
explicit government position on how amnesty and prosecution should relate to each other 
in the future, and the lack of clarity might well spark fears and unrest among LRA return-
ees. Secondly, the first case of the !CD has arguably also shown that demands for more 
positive complementarity, meaning more domestic trials, in ICC cases shou ld be voiced 
more carefully. Creating institutions that are legally able to try ICC cases in the situation 
countries is an important goal. Yet just creating these institutions is not enough. One has 
to ensure that appropriate laws are in place and that the court is qualified to deal with in-
ternational war crimes cases. (JRP 20 I 0 p. 5) 
There was a recent rapid situational analysis carried out by the Justice and 
Reconciliation Project between November 28 and December 6, 2011, in the sub-
counties of Bobbi and Unyama (Gulu district) and Koch Goma (Nwoya district), 
and Gulu and Kitgum towns. The objective was to gauge the perceptions and 
opinions on amnesty and whether it is still relevant today in post-conflict North-
ern Uganda. Analysis revealed that an overwhelming majority of the population 
still strongly support amnesty and consider it as vitally important for sustainabil-
ity of the prevailing peace, reconciliation and rehabilitation. 
There are divergent opinions among the war-affected people in Northern 
Uganda concerning how post-conflict issues of justice and reconciliation should 
be handled. Responses gathered by the project camp focal persons from four 
community dialogues conducted in Kitgum and Amuru districts in 2008 indicate 
that while many people in Northern Uganda are of the view that perpetrators of 
war crimes need to be forgiven , a significant majority would also like to see 
some form of accountability meted out. While it has always been assumed that 
war-affected communities wholeheartedly support the use of local mechanisms 
such as mato oput, it is noted that a significant minority have reservations about 
the effectiveness and relevance of these mechanisms (JRP, 2008b). 
Mato Oput 
Mato oput is a long and sophisticated process that begins by separating the af-
fected clans, mediation to establish the "truth" and payment of compensation 
according to by-laws. It is both a process and ritual ceremony to restore relation-
ships between clans in the case of intentional murder or an accidental killing. 
This process and ceremony is undertaken only in the case of intentional or acci-
denta l killing of an individual. The ceremony involves two clans bringing togeth-
er the perpetrator and the victim in a quest for harmony. 
Ugandans have had to grapple with the meaning of justice in this context. For 
a country with such a troubled history, amnesty has come to be seen as the most 
effecti e way of drawing a line between the past and the present in order to re-
build the nation . Uganda's Amnesty Act, introduced six years ago, provides a 
legal framework for this. It recognizes traditional justice mechanisms like mato 
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oput which is bitter drink well known by the Acholi people of Northern Ugandan 
that may have the ingredients for peace between the Ugandan government and 
the rebel LRA as well as promoting community reconciliation. 
Acholi Traditions 
Acholi tradition embodies the principles and practices which have been central to 
the support for reconciliation and amnesty within that community. Through the 
mediation of the traditional chiefs (rwodi) many offences, including homicides, 
have traditionally been resolved by reconciliation. Whenever a homicide takes 
place the rwod i intervene in the situation to "cool down the temperature" and to 
offer mediation. Although the traditional chiefs had since 1911 been supplanted 
by the colonially appointed chiefs (Rwodi Ka1am), their legitimacy has never 
been destroyed . The 1995 Constitution, which allowed for traditional or cultural 
leaders to exist in any part of Uganda, has led to the revival and celebration of 
cultural and traditional institutions in all parts of the country. Today, in a project 
supported by the Belgian government, the rwodi of all the Acholi clans have been 
reinstated and the Lawi Rwodi (head chief) has been elected by the other rwodi . 
After years of conflict and marginalization, the chiefs, like most of their people, 
are poor and royal houses are in need of repair. However, the greatest asset of the 
chiefs-their political independence-gives them enhanced credibility in mediat-
ing reconciliation (Barney, 2002) . 
The unique contribution of the rwodi is through their mediation of the recon-
ciliation process, mato oput, which many Acholi believe can bring true healing in 
a way that a formal justice system cannot. This ceremony of clan and family-
centered reconciliation incorporates the acknowledgement of wrongdoing, the 
offering of compensation by the offender and then culminates in the sharing of 
symbolic drink. Early in November 2001 , a group mato oput ceremony was held 
in Pajule. This involved about 20 recently returned LRA combatants and includ-
ed many others who had already settled in the community. The ceremony was 
supported by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), churches and by Acholi 
in the diaspora. Government officials, the amnesty commissioners, senior army 
commanders in the region and several representatives of NGOs attended the 
function, demonstrating the support of the wider Ugandan community. Another 
ceremony has taken place in Pabbo, in the Gulu district, and others are planned 
for different parts of Acholi. 
In addition to mato oput, individual cleansing rituals routinely take place 
whenever former LRA members return to the community. Most agencies that 
receive and reintegrate ex-combatants ensure that traditional rituals are integrated 
into the process. In a demonstration of the value attached to traditional approach-
es locally, in Kitgum the district earmarked some funds for elders to carry out 
atonement rituals. The Amnesty Act enjoins the Amnesty Commission to "pro-
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mote appropriate mechanisms of reconciliation in the affected areas and the 
Commission has been supportive of the initiatives in Acholi. Although all these 
efforts have contributed to a successful reintegration process it is difficult to at-
tribute specific effects to each element" (Barney, 2002, p.34). 
In Acholi, mato oput is performed after a mediated process has brought to-
gether two families and clans. The offender accepts responsibility, asks for for-
giveness and must make reparation to the victims. The perpetrator and the vic-
tim ' s family then share the root drink from a calabash, to recall and bury the 
bitterness ofthe soured relations (Okello, 2002). 
Another Acholi ritual , gomo tong-the bending of spears-symbolizes the 
ending of hostilities between groups and is also preceded by discussion and truth-
telling. Other cleansing rituals are already used to welcome fanner LRA combat-
ants into the communities. This option, however, is threatened by the war crime 
indictments issued by the ICC for four senior LRA commanders. 
Challenges to Mato Oput as a Method of Conflict Management 
The perception of whether justice has been served or injustices committed in the 
course of a war is a judgment that follows from two possible lines of assessment. 
First, opinions are fanned on the general accounts of the conduct of the conflict 
and a verdict is passed. Second, individual acts or events in the course of the war 
need to be considered, and give separate judgments of their just or unjust charac-
teristics. It ought not to be an "either-or" judgment that glosses over complex 
and serious issues that demand careful consideration. Mato oput and partial ICC 
indictments of the LRA suffer from such generalization and limited focus to a 
truncated period of the conflict. It is partly for this reason that mato oput-the 
Acholi traditional practice of conflict resolution-has been criticized in Northern 
Uganda (see also Pillar, 1988). 
Mato oput as a model for war termination makes no distinction between de-
gree of gravity of crimes and categories of responsibi lity of perpetrators-
abducted children and those who abducted, trained and deployed them and the 
crimes they committed. The principle of retributive justice demands that there 
must be proportionality; that is, the punishment must be commensurate with the 
crime. 
War crimes, crimes against humanity are committed against individuals as 
subjects of human rights discourses. By overemphasizing the fears, misery and 
psychological trauma of a collective, faceless, nameless mass of Acholi survivors 
and their wish for a quick fix, focus is removed from the necessity of exacting 
justice also for those who died horrible deaths because of abuses. Adopting this 
approach obscures the ultimate objective of war and war tennination: the vindi-
cation of human rights by punishing unjustifiable abuses committed in the con-
duct and duration of the conflict (see also Waltzer, 2000). 
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Mato oput and supplemental state or ICC special cou1ts try only alleged LRA 
perpetrators and this biases the whole process of mato oput as a war termination 
model to favor the ethics of national security against ethics of human security. In 
effect, we would not be punishing the LRA for crimes committed against North-
ern Ugandan non-combatants, for which the National Resistance Army/Uganda 
Peoples Defense Forces (NRAIUPDF) are equally culpable, but for crimes 
against the Ugandan state. Therefore, mato oput as a war termination model that 
lays claims to justice and equity would not be ensuring equal justice but abetting 
a possible NRA/UPDF victor ' s justice, ajustice girdled by political expediency. 
In the just war tradition, no peace can come out of an unjust war. And a just 
peace cannot prevail if war termination rules are dictated by assumed victorious 
NRA which waged a war in violation of other' s rights in the first place. Lives, 
property and security have been destroyed through vindictive, politically moti-
vated counterinsurgency strategies. The defeat of violators or their punishment is 
the only means to vindicate those rights, and mato oput as a model seems inade-
quate to make these transcending moral and political arguments. In ending the 
Northern Uganda war, we must not only concern ourselves with what can be 
done but also what ought to be done, a proposition that mato oput as a model for 
war termination is incapable of making. In other words, justice of the ends and 
justice of the means of war must be central to the contemplation of a just peace at 
the end of the Northern Uganda war (Okello, 2002). 
For a just peace to be concluded, judgments about motives of the war and 
how the war was conducted and ended are critical. The most important goal at 
the end of a conflict is the securing of human rights and a just peace. On the 
scales of the principles of the just war tradition of Aquinas, Grotius, Augustine 
and their followers, both the LRA and the Uganda government's motives and 
means used in prosecuting the Northern war cannot be morally justified. This 
would still be the case even if we allowed for the accepted contradictions in the 
just war tradition that lives may have to be destroyed in order to save other lives, 
and that sometimes destructive war is a necessary evil in the defense of certain 
values that constitute fundamental social and moral mainstay of society (Okello, 
2002). 
lrin ' s (20 1 0) report, When the traditional practice of Malo Oput comes into 
play, states that mato oput is "a traditional process of justice that aims to foster 
reconciliation after a killing" (page). Most often this involves two clans-the 
clan of the "aggressor" and the clan of the "survivor"--coming together with 
reconciliation as their aim. 
The process is broken into a few specific steps: 
I. The aggressor confesses their wrongdoings-specifically naming the crimes 
they have committed and those they have killed. 
2. The clan of the aggressor and the clan of the survivor come to an agreement 
regarding compensation for the harm that has been done. 
40 Journal of Global Initiatives 
3. The two clans perform rituals which symbolize that an agreement has been 
reached. 
To apply mato oput and partial ICC indictments to end the Northern Uganda 
conflict and as a basis for a just peace, is tantamount to consciously promoting 
impunity and acquiescing in state-led propaganda that seeks to absolve the 
Ugandan state from responsibility to protect (R2P), and its own unjustifiable 
counterinsurgency strategies that, like the LRA 's insurgency methods, victimized 
unarmed women and children and targeted entire ethnic group for collective pun-
ishment in order to discourage support for insurgency. We are familiar with Am-
nesty International's and Human Rights Watch 's documented cases of rape, sod-
omy, extrajudicial killings, forced displacements and forcible recruitment into 
both rebel and government paramilitaries and militias by both sides. It is not 
coincidental that the LRA and the Ugandan state both are strident proponents of 
mato oput; this is not because of any real possibility for truth-telling, but a means 
for escaping accountability and punishment for their criminal motives, behaviour 
and actions in the war (Otunnu, 2006, p 2). 
Proponents of mato oput fail to appreciate the facts that war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide committed in Northern Uganda center around 
issues of the exercise of state power, human rights, and those who claim to have 
picked up arms to defend themselves or have challenged the legiti macy and pow-
ers of an unjust state. 
Obviously, the state and human rights are subjects of both mun icipal law and 
public international law, but specifically, the individual is the subject of interna-
tional humanitarian and human rights laws. Therefore, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide, are international crimes that must be subjected to the 
exigencies of international norms, justice and appropriate puni shment without 
exception. The Northern insurgency, which was originally organized around 
Acholi factions of remnants of a former national army, was a contestation of state 
power and response to perceived persecution by the state. 
Over the years, it permutated to co-opt regional and geopolitical dimensions 
of politics, ideology, natural resource economics and other aspects of strategic 
international calculation that had nothing to do with Acholi grievances or internal 
Uganda national politics. Consequently, its termination and equitable resolution 
cannot be adequately captured by Acholi traditional or cultural jurisprudence as a 
war termination model that ought to address outstanding grievances and issues in 
order for a just and durable peace to be established by the termination of the con-
flict. 
In any case, the model of mato oput popularized by its varying local and 
international proponents is a bastardized form and convoluted concept of classi-
cal Acholi mato oput. First, the practice was only relevant in inadvertent com-
mission of grievous harm, manslaughter between families, clans, and villages, 
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but never between Acholi and non-Acholi commumttes. Second, in classical 
Acholi practice, inter-tribal and inter-chiefdom conflicts, killings and grievances 
were evaluated on lapii or casas belli , which gave rise to a just ad bellum or the 
moral justification for a war of revenge. The defeat of or suit for peace by the 
perpetrators, leading to culu kwor, or proportionate indemnity or punishment, led 
to a settlement that ended with gomo tong or bending of spears by both sides to 
signify conflict termination, but never mato oput, which was inter-family, inter-
clan and an intra-Acholi practice for accidental harm. 
Therefore, the Lord ' s Resistance Movement/Army and the National Re-
sistance Movement/ Anny conflicts, as deliberate acts of abuses, do not qualify 
for mato opu; indeed, mato oput' s assumed social, psychological and metaphysi-
cal potency could not be thought to be of any value in remediation of rights abus-
es including unj ustified killings in or outside Acholi. In other words, mato oput is 
a poor substitute for a robust, aggressive and vigorous application of international 
humanitarian and human rights laws to vindicate the human rights of the people 
ofNorthern Uganda and provide a basis for a just peace (Okello, 2002). 
For the purpose of argument, mato oput is considered without any practical 
merits in extra-Achol i conflict context. Despite its moral relativism, the practice 
has attracted strident interlocutors, some with compassionate merits, but most 
with indefensible positions rely ing on faith , speculation and deliberate unwilling-
ness to look at the history and facts of the conflicts to infonn the best framework 
for termination and a j ust peace. 
Under the purview of the just war tradition, a war of liberation or one fought 
in defense of human rights must not cause more harm, deaths and misery on the 
people in whose name it is fought. This is to ensure that no unjustifiable killings 
and abuses are perpetrated under the cover of a just war. As a key test for justice, 
in the course of the war or at the end of it, we must not be left worse off by the 
outcomes of the war than we were under prior and prevailing alleged unjust con-
ditions the war sought to right. In the case of Northern Uganda, there is no debate 
about how doubly worse off we are, and none of the belligerents on either side of 
the war comes out of this unscathed as vindicators of human rights. In other 
words, no persuasive case can be made, particularly in defense of the Ugandan 
state that war was the last resort and the least of several more devious and im-
moral courses of action that would have harmed more than protected social and 
economic infrastructures and the fundamental rights of the people who have suf-
fered in Northern and Eastern Uganda. 
For many, mato oput has resulted in successful reintegration into their com-
munities, but the road to complete healing and forgiveness can be long. As stated 
in the Irin (20 1 0) report, Kenneth Oketta, prime minister of the Acholi Cultural 
Authority, supports the practice, saying, " . . . without this process there is no heal-
ing. We need to move forward" (p.23). 
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Conclusion 
The fact that the alleged offenders prefer it, the victims ask for it and the alterna-
tive is ill equipped to do the opposite, we could safely conclude that to date the 
most suited approach in this particular case is the traditional approach. Local and 
rudimentary it may be in the eyes of many, mato oput has embedded in it all the 
internationally acclaimed components of justice: truth telling, acknowledgement 
and reparation. Besides, in this case one cannot met out punishment to the of-
fending party without getting at the victim. Mato oput should at least in the short 
run be left to take the day. This is in tandem with Rosenberg (1999) that " ... a 
country 's decisions about how to deal with its past should depend on many 
things: the type of war endured, the type of crimes committed, the level of socie-
tal complicity, the nation ' s political culture and history" (p.S). 
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